ELGAR HANDBOOKS IN MIGRATION

The Elgar Handbooks in Migration series provides a definitive overview of recent research in all matters relating to the study of Migration, forming an extensive guide to the subject. This series covers research areas including internal migration, the global impact of human trafficking and forced labour, and international migration policy, and constitutes an essential new resource in the field. Each volume is edited by an editor recognized as an international leader within the field and consists of original contributions by leading authors. These *Handbooks* are developed using an international approach and contribute to both the expansion of current debates within the field, and the development of future research agendas.

Titles in the series include:

**Handbook of Culture and Migration**
*Edited by Jeffrey H. Cohen and Ibrahim Sirkeci*

**Handbook on the Governance and Politics of Migration**
*Edited by Emma Carmel, Katharina Lenner and Regine Paul*

**Handbook of Citizenship and Migration**
*Edited by Marco Giugni and Maria Grasso*
Handbook of Citizenship and Migration

Edited by
Marco Giugni

Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva, Switzerland

Maria Grasso

Professor of Political Science and Political Sociology, School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary University of London, UK

ELGAR HANDBOOKS IN MIGRATION

Edward Elgar Publishing
Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA
Contents

List of contributors viii
Acknowledgements xvi

1 Citizenship and migration: mapping the terrain
   Marco Giugni and Maria Grasso 1

PART I THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

2 Normative perspectives on citizenship and migration: the challenge of integration into citizenship in immigration societies
   Matteo Gianni 21

3 Empirical perspectives on citizenship and migration: the challenge of capturing complexity
   Laurence Lessard-Phillips and Nobuko Nagai 37

4 Citizenship models and migrant integration: rethinking the intersection of citizenship and migrant integration through (b)ordering
   Luca Pfirter, Lisa Marie Borrelli, Didier Ruedin and Stefanie Kurt 52

5 Quantitative methodological approaches to citizenship and migration
   Natalia C. Malancu and Alexandra Florea 66

6 Qualitative methodological approaches to citizenship and migration
   Maria Xenitidou 83

PART II MEMBERSHIP

7 General perspectives on membership: citizenship, migration and the end of liberalism
   James F. Hollifield 101

8 Public attitudes toward granting citizenship status and extending rights to immigrants in European countries
   Alin M. Ceobanu and Xavier Escandell 118

9 Migrants’ economic integration: problematising economic citizenship
   Nathan Lillie and Quivine Ndomo 135

10 Membership, migrants and social cohesion
    Shamit Saggar 149
vi Handbook of citizenship and migration

11 Public deliberation and political inclusion: questioning Muslim loyalty in the Netherlands
   Thijl Sunier

PART III RIGHTS

12 General perspectives: citizenship rights and migration
   Thomas Janoski

13 Immigrants, emigrants and the right to vote: a story of double standards
   Jean-Thomas Arrighi

14 Citizenship, refugees and migration in the European Union
   Willem Maas

15 Social protection of migrants and citizenship rights
   Edward Koning

16 Gender perspectives on citizenship rights and social protection for migrants
   Daiva Stasiulis

PART IV PARTICIPATION

17 General perspectives: citizenship, migration and participation
   Katia Pilati

18 Framing citizens in the field of immigration politics
   Rens Vliegenthart

19 Citizenship, migration and voting behavior
   Oliver Strijbis

20 Migrants’ political participation beyond electoral arenas
   Daniela Vintila and Marco Martiniello

21 Protest in the policy field of asylum politics
   Leila Hadj Abdou and Sieglinde Rosenberger

PART V PRESENT CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

22 Citizenship and migration in a globalized world
   Catherine Wihtol de Wenden

23 The multiple dimensions of citizenship and the postnational turn
   Manlio Cinalli and David Jacobson

24 Citizenship and migration in cities
   Sandro Cattacin and Fiorenza Gamba

25 Populism, citizenship and migration
   Pontus Odmalm
The limits of multicultural citizenship and the intercultural citizenship post-multicultural research agenda

Ricard Zapata-Barrero
24. Citizenship and migration in cities
Sandro Cattacin and Fiorenza Gamba

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the Second World War, scholars considered citizenship and migration one the one hand, and social, civic and political rights on the other, in relation to the nation-state (Marshall, 1965; Wimmer, 2002). As we explain in this chapter, however, cities have played a fundamental role in the relationship between citizenship, migration and rights for centuries, in particular in regard to the development of rights for mobile people. In the late medieval and early modern eras, the city was a place of freedom for those who arrived in its territory. This space was the laboratory for capitalism and democracy. Only in the twentieth century did the city become a space that problematised migration and differences. The city lost importance relative to the nation-state, and the diffusion of industry also lessened the city’s economic relevance. Since the 1980s and what has been called the ‘return of the center’ (Herzog, 2010) or ‘the return of the city’ (Sassen, 2010a), the city has again become a bulwark against its conservative surroundings, except that this time it is not feudal power that the city is trying to limit, but the power of the nation-state.

The city is again at the centre of inclusion policies for people in search of freedom, and the nation-state no longer suffices in responding to the challenges of a mobile world. The most evident consequences of this new cleavage between cities and nation-states is cities’ expansion of rights and services to mobile people. We discuss different types of initiatives to create urban citizenship. Common to all of them is that they continuously transform offers of inclusion for mobile people. These rights are more fragile and malleable – ‘plastic’, to use Ana-Maria Konsta and Gabriella Lazaridis’s (2010) concept – than the constitutional rights of citizens of a nation-state. They depend on volunteering and civil society organisations, but also on the reflexivity of the political promoters who govern the city. This urban citizenship as a sum of fragile rights can be read as a contrasting programme to national exclusion policies, but also as an economic and social endeavour on the part of the city, which sees in human mobility a way to expand perspectives and solve problems; the way to creativity, which is so fundamental for the survival of cities.

In the following, we first analyse the relationship between city survival and human mobility, then explain why cities invest in openness, and discuss the specific rights that cities have developed and that distinguish the city from the nation-state.

THE CITY AND HUMAN MOBILITY

What makes a city a city? Walter Siebel put it simply: ‘The city is a place where strangers live’ (Siebel, 2015, p. 285; our translation). Migration is essential for the creation and development of the city. Ancient cities were created to facilitate exchange around a market. Roman and medieval cities were largely founded by lords, princes and religious authorities – the political
or the religious power – in order to introduce economic dynamics to a specific secure territory. The places in which cities are established often reflect only economic considerations: around an agricultural enterprise, near a lake or river, at intersections along important trade routes or in valleys where passage is possible or narrow (Bairoch, 1988). This generally economic basis is not sufficient to explain the existence of cities, however. Cities need people to settle, work and invest there.

These economic and human-mobility concerns explain the creation of cities, but not their survival. The city also has to answer to its promise as a place that affords access to rights, as Henri Lefebvre (1996, pp. 147ff) argues. For Lefebvre, this promise includes the prioritisation of the city as a common rather than an economic project, and rights as part of an urban civilisation (ibid., pp. 178–9). Historians have described the city as a result of the quest for economic benefits, but we cannot, following Lefebvre, ignore that the city is also a cultural artefact that promises rights to those who come to it. Max Weber’s studies on the city partly confirm this view. He argues that the city as a place that gives rights to inhabitants and new arrivals is specific to Europe (Weber, 1922 [2009], p. 741). Only in the ‘Occident’, as he writes, was it possible to create cities based on (property) rights, territorially independent (city) courts and fraternisation between inhabitants and those fleeing aristocratic domination in the countryside. The ‘Oriental’ city, in contrast, was marked by mystic and clan relations to power, which hindered its emancipatory potential (Weber, 1958, p. 99). The Mediterranean city offered far greater freedom than the Asiatic (Weber, 1958, p. 97).

According to Weber, the ‘Occidental city’ potentially liberated migrants from slavery and domination because it constructed itself as a place of fraternity, freedom and equality; conditions necessary for economic exchange based on trust and community-building (fraternity), free entrepreneurship (freedom) and impartial laws (equality). Lefebvre and Weber both see the combination of human mobility, the urban context and rights as conducive to prosperity. Indeed, following Weber’s hypothesis, the continuous reconfiguration of a city’s inhabitants that results from migration needs to be stabilised by rights and duties that make it possible for those unknown to each other to live together in the same territory.

Citing the principle ‘City air makes man free’ (Stadtluft macht frei), Weber indicates a fundamental change in the logic of linking people through rights to territories. He insists on three relevant elements for our topic (Weber, 1958, p. 94). First, beginning in the eleventh century, access to rights in many European cities was based on a given period of residency, often a year and a day. Second, rights were guaranteed for residents once they met this residency requirement; and third, the city protected personal rights against various forms of personal servitude within its territory (see also Simmel, 1903 [1950], p. 418). Here began the dissemination of rights linked to a territory and not to an owner of persons: the territorial principle (Haase, 1989, p. 318). For a long time, urban analysis forgot this intrinsic link between rights, the city and migration, and developed, first in parallel and then hegemonically, a view of the city according to which migrants arriving and living in it were seen as a problem. Only in the 1940s, and with William Foot Whyte (1943), were migrants once again valued as a resource in the city.

The first analysis of urban migration as a problem can be traced back to the social hygienists’ movement in the nineteenth century. City governments asked privileged observers (hygienists, priests and journalists) to enter the world of migrants in the city and report what they found. They adopted a cultural explanation for the self-exclusionary dynamics of people who did not adopt a bourgeois way of life, and they argued that poor neighbourhoods and segregated spaces posed dangers for the whole city. These spaces became stigmatised...
areas. Adriano Balbi and André-Michel Guerry (1829), for instance, developed a ‘moral statistic’ for France and provided insights into the relationship between education and crime, indicating in their cartography the urban territories in which bad education and crime went hand in hand. Similarly, in his Essay on the Gutters or Sewers of the City of Paris, Alexandre Parent-Duchâtelet (1857) studied prostitution, urban waste and sewage systems and argued that neighbourhoods with a high turnover were characterised by poor hygienic conditions and prostitution; as if prostitution and poor hygiene were the same problem.

Not really free from the social hygienists’ prejudices, Georg Simmel added an alternative explanation of migration to cities as a problem. For Simmel (1903 [1950]), people living in segregated neighbourhoods were simply unable to leave their peasant background behind them, and preferred to reproduce living conditions similar to those of their former peasant world in their urban neighbourhoods. Lacking human, economic and social resources, yet still needing communitarian relationships or some kind of mechanical solidarity, they were unable to seize the freedom offered by the city. Inspired by Simmel, Robert Park (1928) introduced a structural element to the segregation analysis that explained segregated spaces in terms of the territorial (and functional) constitution of a city rather than the choices of mobile people themselves. The city organised itself in order to locate migrants and poor people in its less attractive areas. The rich took the best places in the city and confined the poor to the segregated spaces, contributing to a socio-economic and spatial dynamic of exclusion. To demonstrate this dynamic, the Chicago School of Urban Sociology mapped dangerous areas (hot spots) in the city: vice areas, gang areas, rooming houses and taxi-dance halls. The Chicago School’s recommendations, formulated in terms of planning and urban migration policies, were to promote social inclusion by mixing the social composition (the class structure) of neighbourhoods, based on the belief that the poor would orient their ambitions and behaviour on the basis of those of the rich. Anti-segregation policies, then, became the political way of fighting systematic exclusion; a policy choice that remains the principal measure against segregation in many cities to this day.

The Chicago School’s arguments were challenged by the rediscovery of communities in cities as self-regulated spaces of solidarity. Whyte’s (1943) Street Corner Society reflected this new point of view. It interpreted the city’s culturally homogeneous spaces occupied by people of a lower socio-economic status as not only risk areas, but also areas that produced reciprocity and potentially stabilised the city. Social cohesion (and control) is much higher in segregated spaces, and it can help people to survive, both materially and psychologically. Materially, the more homogenous a community is, the easier it is to exchange services in a non-monetary economy (Williams, 2005). Psychologically, identity is not systematically challenged and the recognition of one’s identity is facilitated in homogeneous communities inside segregated neighbourhoods (Warren, 1977).

These arguments lead us to conclude, along with the Los Angeles School of Urban Sociology (Dear and Flusty, 2001), that high-density homogeneous spaces with low socio-economic status are not necessarily problematic. Contrary to the Chicago School’s views, these spaces can help to stabilise urban dynamics that are subjected to ever-changing populations, crime and violence. These spaces also allow social and health services to focus on their users. It is even possible to see these neighbourhoods as arrival and starting points in mobile people’s lives and careers, and to gauge improvement or deterioration in these neighbourhoods (Cattacin, 2009). Migrants in cities constitute self-regulating bodies that are able to interact
City Renewal through Migration

Views of urban migration as problematic are challenged by research indicating that migration is a powerful (social, economic and political) strength (Häussermann 2018). The ways in which cities have dealt with migration and diversity have changed over time. Different types of urban regimes can be distinguished on the basis of their openness and their attitudes towards migration and differences (see Table 24.1).

Medieval European cities created a territory conducive to learning modernity by closing themselves off externally and opening themselves internally. These cities were a laboratory of freedom that was open to change. In contrast, oppressive cities promote closure and homogeneity, thus detaching themselves from urban qualities and the promise of the city. These cities can be found not only in ancient Asia and contemporary authoritarian regimes, but also in democratic contexts, when majorities are played off against minorities and, for example, ‘foreigner-free zones’ are politically promoted and thus socially legitimised (Häussermann and Kapphan, 2000, p. 212).

The industrial city was anything but innovative. It spread without borders, divided itself functionally, and built on the uniformity of spaces and living environments. The urban bourgeoisie organised the city against the urban poor. Uniformity undermined the character of the city, which grew in order to increase production. It thus resembled a ‘growth machine’ that lost its social and spatial complexity, its urbanity (Molotch, 1976). In a post-national and post-colonial constellation, the flexible city focuses on differences, networks itself, and becomes a hub of translocal relations. Saskia Sassen (2002, 2010b) has described this city as a global city, which in contrast to the medieval city does not have to close itself off from the outside, but instead, through constant networking, becomes an indispensable place where social, political and economic dynamics meet and where mobile people are the legitimating points of reference for the global reality of cities (Siebel, 2016).

WHY RIGHTS FOR MIGRANTS IN THE CITY?

In order to establish a link between Weber’s reading of the ‘Occidental City’ of rights and contemporary urban migration policies, it is not sufficient to understand the city as a space for the self-organisation of translocally connected communities. In fact, the links between: (1) migration and innovation; (2) migration and welfare; and (3) migration and translocalism, are the starting points for the reintroduction of the topic of rights for mobile people in the urban context.

Richard Florida’s (2002b, 2005) empirical findings indicate that cities are the source of society-changing ideas. Like Weber (1920 [1976]), Florida has investigated not only the
contexts in which innovation is possible, but also whether and why cities differ in the extent to which they promote innovation (in his case in the United States). In contrast to Weber’s *Protestant Ethic* (1920 [1976]), Florida’s independent variable is not religion, but a whole series of indicators that together measure urban creativity. These indicators operationalise Edgar Salin’s (1960, p. 27) idea of urbanity by measuring, above all, a city’s openness and attractiveness. The indicators measure the concentration of talent (university degrees), artistic activity (which Florida, 2002a refers to as the Bohemian indicator) and diversity based on mobility and homosexuality, and they are combined with indicators on innovation (patent applications, high-tech indices of cities). Not surprisingly, Florida concludes that openness and diversity are strongly correlated with innovation: ‘Social, cultural, and ethnic diversity are strong indicators of a metropolitan area’s high-tech success. Our argument about diversity, then, is simple and straightforward. Diversity of human capital is a key component of the ability to attract and retain high-technology industry’ (Florida, 2005, p. 137).

Florida’s hypotheses resulted in a remarkable debate that extended beyond expert circles. Cities realised that they had to be much more aware of diversity, and that they had to focus their policies on not only growth, but also innovation. As a result, austerity programmes in the area of culture became an innovation taboo, at least in rich cities, which repeatedly led to disproportionate investment in the arts, especially in medium-sized cities. As a consequence of Florida’s work, mobility was also praised anew, and cities polished their image through marketing campaigns. Zurich’s city marketing, for example, encouraged people to ‘live Zurich’ (the city’s slogan was *Wir leben Zürich*, ‘We live Zurich’), and homosexual mayors in Berlin and Paris became model politicians of an open city (Cattacin and Zimmer, 2016).

At the same time, Hartmut Häussermann (2008) noted that German cities, rather surprisingly, invest in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of migrants, and thus low numbers of voters, because ‘there is a fear of a negative image of the city resulting from “bad news” that could affect the “investment climate” or the attractiveness of a city’ (Häussermann, 2008, p. 20; our translation).

The attractiveness of a city seems directly linked to its innovation regime. We can assume that the territorialised production of urbanity contains various dimensions that include the aspects Florida and Häussermann posit as typical of the city, and that can serve as an orientation for urban policy. Thus, the city must radiate openness, which means that it should be recognisable as an open, global city (Sennett, 2006). It can do so by having shops from all over the world that decorate the cityscape, as well as people who, through their clothing, skin, accents and other personal characteristics, dispel any provincial character. The city should also be pleasant to live in, promoting well-being and familiarity without falling prey to social control (Blokland, 2003). Openness also requires cities to understand and decelerate urban transformations such as gentrification (Felder et al., 2015). Offers of participation that allow people to help shape the city are thus also part of the innovative city. Finally, a city also becomes more attractive if it appears as a safe place that constantly seeks compromises between individual and collective freedoms, for example by tolerating drug use when it takes place in private spaces.

It is not surprising that the pluralisation of lifestyles and life situations and the weakening of nation-states has also led to a renaissance of urban, problem- and people-oriented politics (Häussermann and Haila, 2005). National socio-political regulations are no longer sufficient to address increasing vulnerability. Debates about the ‘new poverty’ since the 1980s (see Leibfried and Voges, 1992) show that the nation-state has clearly reached the end of its ability
to deal with the problem, and that local, and especially urban, social policy has become more important and efficient in doing so. This shift is not completely unwanted from the perspective of the nation-state. Financial difficulties, as well as the desire for decentralisation, have strengthened the regional and local levels everywhere in Europe. Yuri Kazepov (2005, pp. 18, 22) has also described this shift empirically and found that, throughout Europe, the rather passive policies of redistribution (social insurance) remain at the national level, while active policies (such as workfare programmes and further training) are decentralised or develop in an autonomous and fragmented manner.

This fragmented shift of policies to cities, which have to deal with complex problems and specific life situations, has consequences for civil rights. According to Kazepov (2005, p. 33), cities are again taking on the role of experimenting with new forms of legal affiliation. Cities are assuming the role of welfare states not for humanitarian reasons, but because urban environments cannot tolerate poverty. In order to promote innovation and investment, cities have an interest in combining urban development and social policy in such a way as to attract ‘clever minds’ and capital and thus promote innovation (Häussermann, 2008, p. 20).

The increasing degree of (internal and international) human mobility – ‘the mobility turn’, as John Urry (2000) calls it – changes and challenges feelings of belonging. The transition from a world of migration and sedentarisation to one of permanent mobility also has consequences for the ways in which belonging is defined. Naturalisations are generally on the rise (Vink and De Groot, 2010, p. 731). In particular, an increasing number of states permit multiple citizenship, which may not weaken the subjective feeling of belonging to a single national territory among those who possess more than one citizenship, but does relativise it (Ronkainen, 2011, p. 260). Thomas Faist (2010, p. 1680) argues that, in a mobile world, the issue of belonging can be solved through multiple citizenship by calming an identitarian dilemma transnationally, so to speak.

At the same time, multiple affiliation promotes identification with transnational or abstract supranational territories. The continuous contact between persons made possible by digital communication technologies gives this space a concrete reality (Nedelcu 2012). Various authors see in this multiple affiliation the potential for the development of an individual cosmopolitan ethic (Blatter, 2011, p. 792; Beck and Grande, 2004).

This increasingly assertive, multiple affiliation is not sufficient to replace concrete territorial references, however, which is why localistic identitarian references develop in parallel. These localistic references are more easily accessible than nation-state references, and allow individuals to identify with certain local places after a short stay – or even during tourist experiences – and to project familiarity and feelings of belonging onto them. The feeling of belonging to the nation-state is therefore weakened not only by multiple national citizenships, but also by increasingly important identity-based translocal references. Manuel Castells (1997, p. 337) explains this dynamic underlying not only people’s difficulties in identifying with nation-states, but also nation-states’ difficulties in regulating plural personal fates in the face of their other national and international challenges. The latter criticism is strongly reminiscent of Emile Durkheim’s claim that the state can only deal with general questions, and that it can approach life-world contexts mostly in an undifferentiated and levelling manner (Durkheim, 1987 [1991], p. 436).
City governments are interested in differences of all kinds. The urban dynamics outlined above show that differences are correlated with innovation. Innovation needs places where new interpretations are worked on. Alberto Melucci (1984) described these places for Milan and showed how new codifications of reality emerge in the free handling of world interpretations. New interpretations that develop on the fringes of society challenge existing ones and seek recognition from the society in question. The fringes where these new interpretations emerge are not isolated places of individualism, but places of alternative communalisation that cities make available to all who wish to engage with society in a unique way. Innovative milieus are characterised not by individualisation and atomisation, but by anarchic communitarianisation. People feel comfortable in these places because their peculiarities are not questioned (Donzelot et al., 2001).

URBAN CITIZENSHIP

The erosion of an unambiguous status as a citizen of a nation-state, as well as the increase in access to partial rights, even without civil rights, in cities, above all among vulnerable groups, has led to a renewal of the debate on citizenship rights. Various concepts have been proposed in discussing the nature of citizenship rights in the present era, all of which point to the abolition of scalar thinking on the part of the state, levels of regulation of citizenship and the liquidity of citizenship rights. With the concept of ‘differentiated citizenship’, Iris Marion Young (1990), for instance, argues that it is necessary to differentiate legal situations in order to find non-discriminatory solutions to complex problems in a complex society. In contrast to uniform republicanism, which is blind to differences, differentiated citizenship attempts to take different starting points into account in legal terms. Similarly, Engin F. Isin’s (2000) concept of ‘urban citizenship’ takes seriously the political centrality of cities in the global age and complements the orientation towards differentiation with its concretisation in the urban context. The city is not only the site of concentrated difference (Bauböck, 2003; Isin, 2000), but also the socio-political arena of the post-national and post-colonial constellation, which must pragmatically develop responses to exclusion and vulnerability that lie outside the logic of the nation-state.

In this context of liquefying legal relationships, the concept of ‘plastic citizenship’ developed by Anna-Maria Konsta and Gabriella Lazaridis (2010) addresses the negative consequences of legal differentiation, which consist in the fact that unequal rights can lead to discrimination. Legal differentiation reflects above all a power gap between those who can grant rights and those who can become victims of legal changes (Konsta and Lazaridis, 2010, p. 368).

This conceptual discussion indicates that more legal forms will be developed that have the potential to improve as well as worsen mobile people’s living situation. However, urban responses to the social and health challenges posed by urban citizenship indicate that the chances of a dignified life for vulnerable groups are likely to increase as a result of the extension of rights. Supra- and international legal discourses also seem to indicate that protective norms based on human rights will become more widespread (Shafir and Brysk, 2006). But which forms of citizenship are currently being developed in cities, and how can rights be given to migrants in the urban context? Citizenship for foreigners, and especially those
Citizenship and migration in cities

without a resident permit, is malleable in the urban context. We introduce three kinds of answers to this question to illustrate this liquid citizenship. They have a logic of increasing recognition, from: (1) the informal civic world of welcoming migrants; through (2) the general posture of a city that announces itself to be safe; to (3) the provision of partial rights for people who have no access to welfare and other services.

The city produces civic answers to the quest for inclusion of newcomers. Different forms of inclusion can be identified, ranging from spontaneous organised welcome activities and groups to services provided by civil society organisations. Welcome groups create openness to a negotiated coexistence based on reciprocal respect. These groups are often created spontaneously, or through civil society groups whose ultimate goal is to promote the ability to live together in a territory of negotiation (Hamann and Karakayali, 2016). Organised civil society groups are the main challengers of policies and proponents of policy reform. Under specific conditions, unilateral welcome activities can create immediate trust and cooperation. These groups and movements have to consider the political-institutional contexts in which they are embedded, because these contexts provide constraints and opportunities for groups’ and movements’ actions (Eizaguirre et al., 2012).

An example of a spontaneous welcome group can be found in Brussels, with the mobilisation around the Parc Maximilian in August 2015. The Belgian government, in a logic of dissuasion, decided to handle only 150 asylum requests per day. The consequence was the abusive creation of a village at the Parc Maximilian. The story’s end is more interesting for our purposes. Thousands of volunteers provided the refugees with various types of material help. Government inactivity was replaced by citizen engagement (Mescoli et al., 2019, p. 182). Migrants’ associations, major points of reference for people arriving in the city, are similar to spontaneous welcome groups. They help migrants to find housing, employment and trustworthy people, but they are also islands of tranquillity that allow migrants to find quiet moments (Duchêne-Lacroix 2006). Another, more institutionalised example can be found in the field of access to health. In Reggio Emilia, for instance, Caritas, a Catholic social institution, organises an independent health shelter for undocumented migrants. It is complementary to the state-regulated health system, and other associations and the local state are aware of it. People without a residency permit who live in Reggio Emilia are sent to Caritas for health services (Cattacin and Renschler, 2008).

Why can these engagements be seen as producing rights? Many of these volunteers and all of the organisations involved are linked to the governments of the cities in which they exist. They are at least tolerated, and often subsidised to do the job state agencies are not willing, not able or not permitted to do. These initiatives create an urban climate of inclusion by granting newcomers, in particular vulnerable people, access to basic services respectful of human rights.

Contemporary ‘sanctuary cities’ are places that have decided, on a political level, to provide refuge to undocumented migrants and refugees without pursuing them for infractions linked to their migrant status (Lippert and Rehaag, 2012). This movement began in the United States and spread first to Canada and the United Kingdom, and then to continental Europe. The main reason why cities declare themselves sanctuaries is related to continuous conflicts between the local and the national or federal police authorities in the application of laws related to migration and residence. Governments of cities, places where people without residency permits live and invest, have chosen to resolve the ambiguity between legality and belonging.
by privileging cities’ interest in defending the people who live there, creating safe spaces in their territory (Ridgley, 2008).

Although sanctuary cities do not adopt uniform policies (Bauder, 2017), they do share some things in common. In particular, they do not prosecute people without a legal residence status, provided those people break no other laws; they provide basic services for these people – access to health care, schools and social services – following the human rights perspective; and they engage in anti-discrimination activities in order to promote the social, economic and political inclusion of undocumented residents.

To live in a sanctuary city is to enter a world of negotiated and partial rights that are sufficient to live with dignity. These rights are relatively stable, and they persist even through changes in city government. The stability derives from the narrative that sanctuary cities offer to explain their decision to join this movement. Indeed, participating in this movement permits city governments to tell a history of inclusion, a message that goes much further than talking about undocumented migration. A good example is the statement by Chicago’s then Mayor, Rahm Emanuel, regarding Chicago’s adoption of the Welcoming City ordinance: ‘This Welcoming City ordinance will make Chicago a national leader in welcoming those who play by the rules, contribute to our economy and help make Chicago the incredible city that was envisioned by its first immigrant settlers’ (Mayor’s Press Office, 2012, p. 1). Emanuel clearly linked Chicago’s origins and its contemporary policies, and in doing so linked national leadership, an openness to differences (useful for the economy) and the sanctuary cities movement – which brings us back to Richard Florida’s ideas.

A third way to act in a logic of rights regarding precarious migrant situations can be seen in the elaboration of specific instruments that envision social inclusion. This step-by-step development of rights is the way European cities began to deal with undocumented migrants. It began with school access for the children of undocumented migrants (Gonzales et al., 2019, pp. 121ff), followed by measures to permit and improve access to health care among undocumented migrants (for instance, the Carta Sanitaria Leggera, first established in Reggio Emilia; for an overview, see Björngren Cuadra and Cattacin 2011), and it has since expanded to include measures to regulate the status of migrants (see in particular the Papyrus initiative in Geneva; Kaufmann, 2019, p. 445). These partial measures spread from Southern to Northern Europe, indicating that the more developed the welfare state is, the more difficult it finds it to include newcomers, in particular when they do not have a residency permit (Cattacin et al., 2007).

The Proliferation of Social Rights in the Urban Context

The different approaches to giving rights to migrants in the city that we have discussed can be seen as responses to the crisis of the traditional model of access to rights and power as described by Thomas H. Marshall (1965), who argued that full citizenship exists only with the provision of social rights, after civic and political rights are achieved. Marshall’s view has been challenged by migration and feminism, but also by the decline of the traditional welfare state. Human mobility challenges Marshall because it multiplies national belongings, results in transnational life courses (in which citizenship means belonging to a unique world; see Kuisma, 2008) and creates different understandings of rights. Feminism challenges Marshall’s view because of its critique of the idea of sameness (Scott, 1988) and introduction of differentiated forms of citizenship (Young, 1990). The crisis of the traditional welfare state
is a supplementary institutional challenge to the nation-state. Already struggling to preserve its autonomy in the face of globalisation, the nation-state is having difficulties in responding to new social trends such as the ‘new poverty’, the return of civil society organisations, the liberal discourse of self-responsibility, and the need to guarantee basic social rights instead of offering full social protection (Bonoli, 2005).

The city enters this space of challenges as a rich and pragmatic level of governance by initiating programmes based on community involvement, respect for differences and the fight against marginality. Rainer Bauböck (2003) sees the city as a producer of cosmopolitan citizenship; while Isin (2000) refers to a performative, active citizenship.

This perspective makes it possible to analyse the various dimensions of migrants’ rights at the urban level. Formal rights (and duties) are minimal rights that guarantee no more than survival (Donzelot, 2004). Identity and belonging are more an instrumental discourse of the political elite (the narrative of the open city) than genuine attempts to promote inclusion, while social ties are identity-stabilising basics (Gamba et al., forthcoming).

CONCLUSIONS

It seems that all the rights produced at the urban level are managed by the strong powers of government. The poor, and migrants without formal political rights, without lobbies, without the skills to fight power relations, nonetheless exist as persons criticising the ‘plasticity’ of their citizenship with claims for recognition (Chimienti et al., 2010). Not all rights are available to them. That is the lesson learned by people who ask for their dignity and human rights to be respected, and find in local (urban) governments partners that support their claims. In this chapter, we have examined the relationship between cities’ prosperity and the development of rights. The functionalisation of the city during the industrial era abandoned this relationship and introduced a period of decline of the city as an economic and political centre in favour of the nation-state. The economic crisis of the 1970s and the subsequent deindustrialisation in developed nations obliged a radical transformation of the economy. Nation-states opened a new period of worldwide development by abating borders and thus reinvigorating the economy – a new, innovation-oriented, globally interlinked economy – but in the process lost their ability to control the economy and became weaker. Globalisation is inherent to the return of the global city and its power, but also to international competition between cities on the basis of their attractiveness and quality of life, qualities that appeal to elites. Cities as global nodes in search of quality of life in a context of a weakening nation-state are also constrained to reinforce their social policies by promoting forms of rights, thus creating a context of belonging through urban citizenship. These rights, established alongside nation-state-defined citizenship, are instrumental to city governments’ attempts to reinforce their global economic position and are dependent on the success of this economic strategy. In this sense, they are fragile. Nevertheless, such rights, respectful of everyone’s subjectivity, create urban belonging and civility, a by-product of economic well-being that reinforces cities’ resilience and quality of life.
NOTES

1. For Lefebvre, the city is a commons in the sense that it is a place of differences and freedom for all, and it has to be defended against the profit-driven interest in privatisation. This right is intimately related to participation and democracy.
2. See, in particular, Bairoch (1988), Pirenne (1927) and Zuiderhoek (2016).
3. The importance of trust, freedom and equality for economic performance has been postulated by several economists and economic sociologists; see, for instance, Stiglitz et al. (2010).
4. See the contributions in Cohen and Johnson ().
5. Similarly, in London, Reverend Mearns entered the world of poverty and described migrants as people without morals (Mearns, 1883, p. 18).
6. See, for instance, Park et al. (1968), Burgess and Bogue (1974) and McKenzie (1922).
7. At the same time, however, it also leads to symbolic rearguard positions on the part of nationalist-oriented parties (Adamson et al., 2011, p. 847).
8. According to Liza Mügge (2012), the more one is rejected in one’s current location, the more strongly one identifies with one’s country of origin.
9. Critiquing this view, Meyda Yeğenoğlu (2005) argued that cosmopolitanism is reserved for people in rich countries.
10. See also the concept of ‘anchored cosmopolitism’ suggested by Marco Martiniello (2018) to indicate the relevance of the local for global urban youth.
11. The similarity of these two diagnoses, one at the beginning of the twentieth century and the other at the beginning of the twenty-first, is astonishing. The transitional mood, the regulatory weakness of the state, uncertainty about the future, irrepressible financial capital, the primacy of urban social policy, and disenchantment with politics, are just a few diagnoses that are characteristic of both classical and contemporary social science.
12. With this term, Isin (2007, p. 224) indicates that it is impossible to control national loyalties.
14. Cities are challenged to react, especially with regard to irregular mobility. The concept of ‘urban citizenship’ is also regularly employed in regard to this issue (also critically; see, for instance, Varsanyi, 2006).
15. Particular attention should be paid to legal discussions that aim to establish mobility rights that include protections not only in places where mobile people live, but also during their mobility, such as those required by International Labour Organization (ILO) guidelines; (ILO, 2010, p. 263); see also the discussion on transit states by Christina Oelgemöller (2011).
16. This is in keeping with the Maussian perspective, which links generous giving to freedom, the creation of social ties and belonging (Mauss, 1925; Joseph, 2002, p. 104).

REFERENCES


Handbook of citizenship and migration


Herzog, L.A. (2010), Return to the Center: culture, Public Space, and City Building in a Global Era, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.


